Gate the guest Wi-Fi card on its own key, and gate its poll endpoint properly
The home card used to be grant-gated by the shell's card table, which left the poll endpoint behind `auth` alone — and that endpoint returns a LIVE CREDENTIAL: the guest network's current rotating password and its join QR code. "Any logged-in user" was never an adequate gate for that; the card table was doing the work, and the card table is gone. New key rather than reuse: unifi.guest_wifi exists precisely so front-desk staff can be given the guest password WITHOUT any other network access. Reusing unifi.settings would have meant handing out controller configuration to get a Wi-Fi password read. Authorised inside the controller rather than by route middleware, so the endpoint stays outside the unifi page-permission groups — it is a home-page widget, not a unifi page. Nobody holds the new key until it is granted, so the card is invisible until then. That is the intended direction: capability is assigned deliberately. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01RDA3fQbsa3gaHCFoV1Q8Gg
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@@ -57,29 +57,41 @@ class GuestCardController extends Controller
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* unchecked, so any signed-in account — every student and parent included —
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* could fetch the live guest Wi-Fi password by requesting the URL directly.
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*
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* The endpoint now enforces what the comment always claimed: you may poll it iff
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* you may see the card. Super admins pass, as everywhere else. Kept as the card
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* gate rather than a permission so the widget stays grantable to non-unifi staff,
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* which is the point of a home-page card.
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* The endpoint enforces what the comment always claimed: you may poll it iff
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* you may see the card. Still asked as the CARD gate — via the registry, which
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* now answers from the card's permission (unifi.guest_wifi) instead of the
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* retired dashboard_card_grants table. Asking the registry rather than naming
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* the key here is deliberate: the endpoint and the home page cannot drift.
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* Super admins pass, as everywhere else (keysFor handles that).
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*/
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public function data(Request $request)
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{
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$user = $request->user();
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abort_unless($user, 403);
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if (! $user->is_super_admin) {
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$allowed = \App\Models\DashboardCardGrant::accessibleCardKeysFor($user)
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->contains(self::CARD_KEY);
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abort_unless($allowed, 403);
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}
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abort_unless(
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app(\App\Support\DashboardCardRegistry::class)->visibleTo($user, self::CARD_KEY),
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403,
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);
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return response()->json(self::payload() ?? ['title' => null]);
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}
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/** Card registry resolver. */
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/**
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* Card registry resolver.
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*
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* Re-checks the permission the registry already gated on, the way bosch's and
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* signinout's resolvers do. Redundant on the home-page path and deliberately
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* kept: renderFor() renders whatever key list it is handed, and the payload
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* here is a live credential — the one card where "the caller asked the right
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* question" is not a good enough reason to hand it over.
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*/
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public static function resolve(User $user): ?array
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{
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if (! $user->can('unifi.guest_wifi')) {
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return null;
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}
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return self::payload();
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}
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